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COMMENT
LISTEN TO THE DRUMSTHE COMPULSORY JOINT RETURN
By the time a professor of taxation met his eleven o'clock class on

the morning of December the eighth, the events of the past twentyfour hours had entirely disrupted all student interest in the law. His

pupils "remembered Pearl Harbor." They had tried to "carry on"
and learn bankruptcy at eight o'clock, their nine o'clock class had
been self-dismissed to listen to the declaration of war upon Japan, the
ten o'clock hour had been devoted to lively bull-sessions; The professor of taxation knew he must either break the tension or dismiss the

class.

"From what I hear on the radio," he started, "many legal
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problems may be overshadowed by current events. But I'll give anyone
here ten-to-one that taxation continues." Suddenly the class laughed,
the, circuit of electric suspense snapped, and the meeting was one of the
finest in the course.
That taxation will continue and increase is an obvious truism. This
accentuation will, however, have a peculiar interest to Washington
taxpayers. A pronounced inequality exists in the application of the
income tax to married persons similarly circumstanced but living in
community property and non-community property states. The former
much more frequently enjoy the privilege of the separate return, thereby avoiding higher surtax brackets, because their state has declared
that the income of either, unless from separate property, belongs to
both. Since the salary of the husband, for example, is community
property, the Supreme Court has held that the spouses could each file
separate returns on one-half of it.' The Court looked at the Revenue
Act, which states that the tax is to be "levied and collected

. . .

upon

the net income of every individual", 2 and decided that the "of" denoted
ownership rather than procurement.3
The advantage enjoyed in community property states is easily perceived, and the unequal tax load on otherwise comparable families
living in different states is evident. Upon looking deeper, however, a
more general-and just as discriminatory-use of separate returns can
be found. They are permissible whenever the wife has income which,
under the law of the state of domicile, is separate. In most states,
individual returns are used when the wife has her own income either
from a salary or from her separate capital. In community property
states, the privilege is more widely enjoyed because by law practically
every wife has separate income, for example, one-half of her husband's
salary.
Ignore the community property aspects for the moment, and consider the general operation of separate returns upon family A and
family B. Each has a net income of $20,000; each consists of a husband, wife, and two children; each pays a considerable income tax.
In family B, however, the wife contributes $10,000 toward the family
wealth, either from a salary or from her investments-probably the
latter through appropriate transfers of property from her tax conscious
husband.4 Two returns are filed by family B, and each spouse pays a
'The incongruity of such a holding is apparent. Separateness of husband and wife is the underlying theory of separate returns; yet community property is based upon the unity of spouses. As stated by M\fr.
Altman, "the division of community income between husband and wife
in separate returns was a division allowed for the very reason that the
income was indivisible." Altman, Community Property in Peril (1941) 19
TAx MAG. 262, 264.
2 Ir.
REV. CODE § 11 (1939). Italics supplied.
2 Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U. S. 101 (1930).
Because the case turned upon

construction of the income tax laws, the Court also relied upon the failure
of Congress to adopt legislation contra the argument of the successful
taxpayer.
4In non-community property states, most of the separate income of
wives comes from capital rather than from salaries. The use of individual

returns thereby works in favor of many persons enjoying "unearned"
income. Compare this thought with the Congressional policy of lightening
the tax load slightly on "earned" income through the earned income credit
of 10 per cent. See IxT. REv. CODE § 25 (a) (3) (1939).
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surtax on income below the $10,000 bracket-about 13% of the
income subject to surtax. Yet family A, although living costs and
ability to pay are identical, must pay a tax of fifteen hundreds more
dollars since its income is that only of the husband and falls just below
the $20,000 bracket-about 21% of the income subject to surtax."
Community property presents only a specialized form of this inequality. If family A, in which the husband earns all the income, lives
in Washington, these spouses will now find to their convenience that
they are in the same position as family B in the non-community property state. Thus American families discover that unless they have
separate income as normally understood in non-community property
states, or separate income by operation of law in community property
states, their family coffers will be reached by the higher surtaxes.
The preceding examples purposely have been phrased in terms of
discrimination against the non-community, one-income family. Since
Congressional efforts are being directed more and more toward increased revenues, one may well suggest that our legislators will find no
time to aid the "oppressed." Another approach, however, proceeds
upon the premise that the tax load of the one-income family is fair,
and is properly based upon ability to pay. It follows that those who
can file separate returns have a windfall. One can conclude from this
minor premise that equalization of the tax burden will increase the
revenues by removing an advantage rather than decrease federal receipts by eliminating a discrimination. Thus the. war will probably
make triumphant heretofore unsuccessful efforts 6 to eliminate the
favored position of the separate returnT
Five plans to balance the operation of the tax load upon families
have been suggested:'
rRoughly, family A would pay a tax of $4,300.00, while husband and
wife in family B would each pay only $1,40.00-a- total of $2,800.00. This
amounts to a $1,500.00 differential; family A pays over 50 per cent more
tax than does family B.
6For example, see Hearings Before a Sub-Committee of the Committee
on Ways and Means, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 21; Paul, The Background
of the Revenue Act of 1937 (1937) 5 U. OF CnL L. REv.'41, 84-5. Community
property senators, helped by ignorance and indifference on the part of
the rest of the country, have thwarted such attempts. GREEN, THEoRY Amq
PRAcTICE OF MODERN TAXATioN

(2nd ed. 1938) 51. Although the addition

of Oklahoma to the ranks of those states having a community property
standing swells this body of senators to 18, the present writer. feels that
the "ignorance and indifference" will disappear. See note 7, infra.
7 The Seattle Times, Jan. 25, 1942, p. 1, col. 3, carried a story on the
Treasury's program for "plugging loopholes" in the income tax laws. The
community property law, said Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, costs
the Treasury about $55,000,000 annually, and separate returns in other
states decrease revenues by about $260,000,000 each year. As suggested
above, his attack is on the ground of tax avoidance rather than on the
basis of eliminating a discrimination.
8Community property creation of separate income is only a segment
of a more general problem--Whose Income Is It?" See GRIswoLD, CASES
ANm MATERIALS ON FEDERAL TAXATiON (1940) 422 et seq. Poe v. Seaborn,
282 U. S. 101 (1930) established that community income is the separate
income of each spouse, fifty-fifty. This holding, however, was by no
means the end of litigation involving the impact of community property
law. The issue has now become: What Is Community Property and Income? It amazes one to glance at the indices to recent volumes of Board
of Tax Appeals Decisions and thus to realize the body of community
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1. Adoption by all states of an elective community property system
-the Oklahoma Plan.
2. Extra deductions on the joint return which will make it so attractive that all families will choose the joint return.10
3. Division of income between husband and wife in all states permitting all to enjoy separate returns. 1
4. Disregard of marital status for income tax purposes."
5. The compulsory joint return of husband and wife."
The first suggestion contemplates no federal action, and merely
leaves to each state whether it will climb on the band wagon. Even
if this motive of tax avoidance were sufficient to overcome the inertia
of the status quo of property law in non-community states,'1 4 it seems
absurd to force a complete change in property law upon states which
desire it only for one purpose. This suggestion appears to be both
ineffective and impractical.
The second and third suggestions seek the same result as the compulsory joint return-the placing of all families upon an equal tax
level-by a different means which would not encounter a constitutional
property law that is being considered by the Internal Revenue Bureau.
Assignments between family members to create separate income have
vexed the courts as well as the treasury department for years, and interfamily trusts have prompted numerous litigations. See Bruton, The Taxation of Family Income (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1172 and recent cases, note 51,

infra. This comment goes deeper than any of these specialized problems.
The writer recognizes that under existing statutes and legal principles.
separate returns are permissible. The quarrel is with the continuation of
the separate return, regardless of why the income is separate. In the
following discussion of the compulsory joint return, one will appreciate
not only that inequality will be swept away, but also that the very trying
problem of whether certain income is that of husband or wife will be
eliminated, for it will make no difference whose income it is if the spouses
have to file a joint return.
9A good discussion can be found in Daggett, The Oklahoma Community
Property Act-A Comparative Study (1940) 2 LA. L. REV. 575.
10 Gutkin and Lesnik, Espousing Spouses for Taxation Purposes (1940)

18 TAX MAG. 731, 735 et seq. Practical examples have been worked out
to show the effectiveness of their plan in practice. See also Paul and
Havens, Husband and Wife Under the Income Tax (1936) 5 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 241. These authors feel that the compulsory joint return would be
held unconstitutional and suggest the deduction plan as sound constitutionally, for deductions are a matter of legislative grace. Heiner v. Donnan,
285 U. S. 312 (1932), however, suggests that the fifth amendment prohibits arbitrary classifications by Congress just as the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment prevent unreasonable classification by state legislatures. As suggested later, p. 110, infra,
the compulsory joint return should be treated as a classification problem.
Under this approach, it would survive and fall exactly the same as the
deduction proposal. See note 15, infra, suggesting that economic compulsion makes the joint return in fact mandatory.
11 Altman, Community Property; Avoiding Avoidance by Adoption in
the Revenue Act (1938) 16 TAX MAG. 138.
12
Altman, Community Property and Joint Returns (1941) 19 TAX MAG.

588.
Is Bruton, The Taxation of Family Income (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1172;
Comment (1941) 10 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 92; Comment (1941) 28 VA. L. REv.
88; Comment (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1279. See also an expansion of this suggestion-a complete family return including all persons living in the same
household, note 49, infra.
2"Daggett, note 9, supra, recognizes that Oklahoma adopted its elective
community property plan for income tax purposes.
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problem presented by the latter.' 5 Since this constitutional objection
probably is of little weight today,' the simpler joint return proposal
is an easier means to the same end. The second suggestion involves
a highly complicated system of deductions and exemptions which would
only add to the confusion of an already too complex tax measure The
third would'necessitate a revision of surtax brackets, and would place
a heavier burden upon unmarried persons. They both seek the same
end, equality, but the second uses joint returns as the means while
the third expands the availability of separate returns.
The fourth proposal wants to treat the income of spouses the same
as the income of unmarried persons. The impact of community property laws-an incident of marriage which would be ignored-upon the
status of income would be eliminated.' 7 The availability of separate
returns in community property states would be greatly curtailed, but
the advantage of the separate re.turn would still exist for "genuine'?'
separate incomes of spouses both in community and non-community
property states. This suggestion differs from all the other proposals
for the others would reach the end of putting all families on an equal
basis regardlessof the source of the income. Since the fifth suggestion,
the compulsory joint return, is the least complex means to complete
equalization, the remainder of this comment will concern itself with
the choice between ends: Complete reform through the mandatory
joint return v. Partial reform through disregard of the marital status
for income tax purposes.
There is at least some possibility that the elimination of the favored
position of families in community property states by use of the fourth
proposal will be the extent of the 1942 amendments, since that aspect
of the unequal application of the income tax law is the most commonly
noticed.' 9 If Congress enacts such legislation, the Washington taxpayer will have difficulty in determining the status of income from
capital, and the Bureau of Internal Revenue will be confronted more
and more often by other devices to keep the income separated. In
Washington, would property purchased prior to the enactment of the
suggestion be owned half-and-half for tax purposes? Or would its
rBut can we say that the second (extra deductions), plan is not in
fact the compulsory joint return? Certainly in substance the husband and
wife are forced to file a joint return because of an economic saving greater
than the avoidance of high surtax brackets in separate returns. Very
logically, then, any arguments against the compulsory joint return apply
as well to this "deduction" proposal. See note 10, supra.
'I See discussion, p. 109, infra.
17One writer suggests the following amendment to the income tax laws
to carry this suggestion into effect: "The amount reported on each return
shall be determined without increase, diminution, or division because of
any right, title, or interest created by or dependent on the marriage
relation."
Altman, note 12, supra, at 590.
" 8 That is, the law would look more to the procurement of the income
than to its ownership.
19 Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau is aware of the tax savings
created by separate returns in other, than community property states. See
note 7, supra. Notice that the tax saving in non-community property states
is considerably larger than that in community property states. Of course,
there are 39 non-community states and only 9 community property states.
See also Mr. Morgenthau's strong views before the Senate. Hearings
before Finance Committee on H. R. 5417, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941) 3, 12
et seq.
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"tax ownership" be traced to the source of the funds used to buy it?
What about income from capital acquired after the new act? The
fourth suggestion lacks detail, and seems to be looking only at salaries.
Its ramifications are unpredictable.2 0
The avoidance of peculiar and vexing problems would seem sufficient
reason for Washington interests to favor the choice of the compulsory
joint return since the favored position enjoyed up to the present must
inevitably go before long. 2' Why not let the reform broom sweep clean?
Are there any compelling reasons against complete equality through the
compulsory joint return?
The privilege of filing separate returns creates discrimination between
families. Nevertheless its advocates counter that the joint return would
discriminate between two other classes. Mrs. A and Miss B each has
a salary of $5,000 a year, but since Mrs. A's husband contributes
$10,000 to the family funds, Mrs. A, under the joint return, finds her
income tax computed in a higher surtax bracket. The joint return,
continues the argument, discriminates between married and unmarried
persons.
Even admitting the doubtful proposition that joint returns also
result in a discrimination,2" is the choice between evils difficult? Surely
families with one source of income are more nearly comparable to
families with two sources of income than single persons are to spouses.22
.0 Commentators who favor merely the elimination of the community
property advantage are attracted and incensed by the privilege in those
states of separating the husband's salary for income tax returns. Certainly
this particular advantage jars the one-income family in non-community
states the hardest. The remedies suggested, therefore, are shooting at
the removal of this peculiar form of tax avoidance, and the impact upon
income from capital is overlooked. Such lobbyists must broaden their
viewpoint; otherwise, Congress may commit the common legislative error
of dropping two eggs while trying to catch one that has slipped.
Another suggestion which looks only at community property states
would not be as confusing as that of Mr. Altman, but has even more bugs
in it for the community property taxpayer. This scheme would levy the
income tax upon "the manager of the property"-in Washington, the husband-and all community income would be included with his separate
income. Notice particularly that community income includes the salaries
of both spouses. Inequality between states would remain, for under this
proposal the discrimination would be against community property taxpayers! The separate return would be unavailable in Washington unless
the wife had separate, income-producing capital. Report of Committee on
Ways and Means, H. R. 350, 67th Cong., Ist Sess. (1921) 11; Hearings before
Committee on Ways and Means, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (Revenue Revision)
(1924) 194, 348, 349, 375, 478, 482.
21 See

discussion, p. 103, supra.

Presumably the income tax is based upon ability to pay, and since
Mrs. A has access to her husband's pockets, she is "better off" than Miss B.
23 A brief on the compulsory joint return was prepared in August, 1941,
by the New York County Lawyers' Association. Committee on Taxation.
Hearings before Finance Committee on H. R. 5417, note 19, supra, at 176.
They suggest that in families where the members' incomes are in thmedium brackets, "their treatment of all the income of each of the members as common income is unusual. If a man with [considerable] 'ncome
. . . should marry a woman with a little income of her own, which is
not used toward the support of the family, why should the husband's
tax burden be increased and the wife be subjected to tax at high rates on
her small income?" The last thought, referring to the wife, is untenable,
because, regardless of whether her income is pooled or used for her ex22
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Only the joint return will place all families upon an equal basis.2 4
Yet opponents of the compulsory joint return argue as follows:
"That the innocent [genuine separate income taxpayers]
often suffer with the guilty [community property separate
income taxpayers] is a defect of life which has always harassed the preacher of virtue .... The innocent often suffer
with the, guilty because the legislator-or the perpetrator--of
justice cannot distinguish the innocent from the guilty." 5
This language is hard to follow. The only "guilt" in community
property states rests upon the fact that more families are able to take
advantage of the separate return than in other states. The basic
difficulty is the different tax load on similarly circumstanced families.
Community property creation of separate income is only one means
that leads to inequality, and if our sense of fair play demands reform
a finger to cure an infection
we should do more than merely amputate
2
which has spread from the wrist. 6
Another objection has been raised to the sweeping provisions of the
compulsory joint return suggested to Congress in 1941.27 Joint returns were to be required of husband and wife for each taxable year
during which at any time they lived together. 2 Marriage and living
together were the two conditions that would require, a joint return.
By eliminating either condition, two socially undesirable means of
tax evasion were thus to be made possible. First, a couple with substantial incomes might choose to live togethr --but not to marry.
Would any number of Americans with sufficient wealth to effect an
appreciable income tax saving through separate returns incur the condemnation of society just to save a few hundred, or even a few thousand, dollars? To people of means, social ostracism-or perhaps just
lifted eyebrows-would be more painful than the payment of a larger
income tax. The compulsory joint return would promote free love in so
few cases, or cause the morallyprudent to "forget one another" in denial
of fundamental principles so rarely, that the policy of all sovereigns to
traordinary whims, she is a part of the family unit and is better off than
an unmarried woman because of her husband's support. Probably a husband has a better complaint than his wife when her income is not pooled.
When one considers, however, that unless a man's wife has separate income
for her caprices she will ask for an allowance above household expenses,
is not this husband better off than the normal man who moans once a
month about the "unnecessary" bills of his wife?
2AAs noted previously, other proposals will reach the end of complete
equalization. The writer is now considering the joint return as the best
nominee
for the job.
2
"Altman, note 12, supra. One can fear just the opposite. Mr. Altman
abhors the possibility that Congress may go all the way; the real injustice
will continue if Congress only scratches the surface and does not get
down to the basic "guilt"--the separate return.
"Compare the directly opposed view expressed in Mr. Altman's reference to the compulsory joint return: 'Itwas a cure that would destroy
the tissue with the germ." Altman, note 12, supra, at 589. His germ is
the community property advantage; it is humbly suggested that the real
germ is the separate return, and community property privileges merely
part27 of the infected tissue.
H. R. 5417, as introduced in the House, § 111 (a).
Two exceptions were declared: The year in which the marriage
occurred, and any year in which a reconciliation was effected if separation had prevented a joint taxable year immediately preceding.
28

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 17

protect marriage would not be contravened by the mandatory joint
return.
Second, would the tempetation of separate returns lead otherwise
happily married spouses to live apart? The thoughts expressed above
negate such an idea, let alone the fact that the increased expenses of
separate residences would probably be as great as, or even greater than,
the income tax saving.
One administrative problem, however, would arise where for any
reason separation had taken place without divorce. Mr. A files his
separate return in Seattle, and Mrs. A files hers in Portland. Later the
revenue department gets wind of the fact that on an evening last Fall,
Mr. A was seen entering his wife's residence. Furthermore, the neighbors disclose that they did not see him leave-and they kept a close
watch! -until the following morning. Think of the scandal created
when it is proved that Mr. A spent a night with his wife! The Board
of Tax Appeals may have to examine the evidentiary facts needed to
prove adultery to determine tax liability. Yet this man is not a correspondent; he is the husband.
This difficulty has been over-emphasized. 2 9 It could be liquidated
by eliminating "living together" as a factor forcing the joint return.
Then the family tax would be imposed on all married persons unless
separated or divorced by law. Such legislation, however, would discriminate against those spouses actually but not legally separated, for
they would have separate expenses and yet pay a high surtax. Congress can choose between the administrative problem of the 1941 suggestion, and the arbitrariness of the above proposal. Neither alternative
presents sufficient difficulty to classify the choice as one between evils.
Another objection can be dismissed summarily. Women's hard
earned property rights and economic freedom 30 are no more injured
by the requirement that they file a join return with their husbands,
than is men's historical independence jeopardized by that which forces
them to pay income, taxes in conjunction with their wives. No one has
suggested that the mandatory return would abridge men's rights.
The economic and social arguments against the joint return strike
one, as superficial and fanciful. A legal thorn, however, prompts one to
hesitate before picking the rose of complete reform since the half-way
measure is free from constitutional objection. 31 Hoeper v. Wisconsin"
involved a state statute requiring the husband to report the income
of his wife and minor children with his own, and to pay the tax on the
entire amount. Since this imposed a tax liability on the husband for
especially Altman, note 12, supra.
York Times, July 19, 1941, p. 12, col. 2.
' Poe v. Seabom, 282 U. S. 101 (1930) turned upon construction of the
Revenue Act. See discussion, p. 102, supra. The indication is that if Congress specifically declared that community property laws are not to be
considered in determining "Whose Income Is It?" no constitutional issues
would be raised. Language in Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269
U. S. 110 (1925), is in point. It would indeed be difficult to argue that
29 See

30
3 New

one-income families in community property states must be classified with
two-income families in non-community states. If Congress emphasizes

the spouse who earns or procures the income as the basis of classification,
they will avoid the holding of the Seaborn case which felt that Congress
had intended to tax upon a basis of ownership of the income.
32284 U. S. 206 (1931).
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income which was not his own," the Supreme Court held that he had
been deprived of property without substantive due process of law in
violation of the fourteenth amendment. Apparently the fifth amendment would place the same limitation upon a federal compulsory joint
return.3 4 A provision allocating liability between husband and wife for
the payment of the tax should meet and answer this constitutional
objection. The spouses would be considered a unit for computation,
but individuals for payment. 5
A less obvious but more fundamental constitutional objection to the
joint return was suggested in the Hoeper case. While allocation of
liability, as suggested above, would meet the specific holding here, the
court recognized by dictum a principle that the taxable value of one's
property cannot be measured by another's. 6 Applying this principle,
one can argue that since higher surtax brackets would be reached by
treating husband and wife as a taxable unit for computation, the
measure of the tax on each spouse is increased. Such a holding, however, would be an extension of constitutional principles, 7 and by
analogy, discredit can be thrown upon the application of the doctrine
to reasonable fact patterns.38 Why not admit that the compulsory
joint return measures the tax on one spouse partly by the income
legally owned and controlled solely by the other, and then try to discover whether such a classification is reasonable? If we are to have a
"imeasure principle" read into the Constitution, should not its restraint
on Congress be determined by the traditional tests applied in due
a3 The husband's ownership and control over the wife's property had
been4 abolished by statute.
Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312 (1932). Note, however, the strong
dissent of Justice Stone.
35Cf. Note (1941) 55 HAnv. L. REV. 145. The tax liability could be ascertained very simply. Each spouse would pay the proportionate share of the
total tax that his income bore to the joint income. England, in effect, has
the compulsory joint return. The spouses file separate returns, but the
surtax is computed in each upon the combined income of husband and
wife and divided between them in proportion to their respective incomes.
Finance Act, 1927, 17 and 18, GEO. V., c. 10, § 42 (9). See also MAGILL, TAxABLE INcorVm (1936)

288.

36" ..because of fundamental principles ... any attempt to measure
the tax on one person's property or income . . . by reference to . . .
another... [is unconstitutional] . . ." Hoeper v. Wisconsin, 284 U. S. 206,

215 (1931).
37Justice Roberts cited Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S.41, 77 (1899) for
this proposition. He did not mention that in the earlier case Justice White
expressly stated: "On this question, however, in any of its aspects, we do
not even intimate an opinion." Thus we find the dicta in the Hoeper case
based only upon a suggested, but not accepted earlier dictum.
a8 See discussion, p 110, infra, especially notes 51 and 52. Maxwell v.
Bugbee, 250 U. S. 525 (1919) offers one analogy. In that case, the surtax
rates of the New Jersey inheritance tax were applied after taking into
consideration assets outside New Jersey. It was unsuccessfully contended
that the state could not consider other assets in determining the rate of
tax because situs deprived it of jurisdiction. In the instant case of the
compulsory joint return, the argument is that the income of a wife cannot
be considered when determining the tax of the husband because ownership by the wife deprives Congress of "jurisdiction" (power) to act. See
also United States v. Whyel, 19 F. (2d) 260 (W. D. Pa. 1927), aif'd, 28 F. (2d)
30 (C. C. A. 3d, 1928) cert. denied, 278 U. S.664 (1929), sustaining in dictum
the compulsory consolidated return for affiliated corporations on the basis
of the unity of control present in such groups:
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process and equal protection cases? Thus the rule might be stated:
Congress cannot arbitrarily and unreasonably measure one's tax by
reference to another's property. Principles resting upon degree create
uncertainty, but the present writer feels that the compulsory joint
return itself is so just that a flat rule of constitutional law vitiating
such a statute would immediately demonstrate that rule to be unsound.
As a practical matter, the husband has indirect benefit from his wife's
separate income just as she does from his, although legally each income
is subject to the individual, unfettered control of only one of the
spouses. The wife is not made to pay a higher income tax because her
income, is measured with her husband's; she has a greater tax liability
simply because she is married and has a greater ability to pay. The
"'measure principle" crops up only because the joint return may be
used by Congress as a means to measure this ability to pay. Since the
joint return is only a means, the end-family equality-is the problem
which should attract our constitutional scrutiny. Any attack upon the
compulsory joint return should be made on the basis of the resulting
classification rather than on the ground of how the tax load is determined. The futility of such an attack, however, has been indicated in
the previous discussion,39 and recent decisions of the Supreme Court,
indicating a recognition of the family as a unit, coupled with the everincreasing need for federal revenue, make one feel that the40 Court
today would quickly limit the Hoeper decision to its own facts.
Two of these recent cases have noted the unity of husband and wife
in a joint return to the detriment of the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
while numerous cases have stopped tax avoidance by recognizing transactions between members of the family as ineffectual. 41 The two
holdings against the government, which recognized that Congress in42
tended to unify husband and wife in the now optional joint return,
are a strong indication that Congressional classification of spouses as
43
one taxing unit would be held reasonable. In Janney v. Helvering,
one spouse had a short term capital gain while the other suffered a
short term capital loss. If by use of the joint return they could set
these off against one another, 44 the unified return would be more advantageous despite the normal saving in separate returns by avoidance
of high surtax brackets. Looking at the language of the Revenue Act
and of the Regulations,45 the Court held that the Congressional intent
"See discussion, p 106, supra.
"Compare a brief attacking the constitutionality of the compulsory
joint return compiled by a group of New York lawyers, note 19, supra.
The Hoeper case was strongly relied upon, but consideration of the impact of a provision allocating actual liability for the tax between husband
and wife to distinguish that decision was not given. Other grounds of
unconstitutionality suggested in the brief are disputed throughout this
paper. One ground, that "the provision for taxing separate incomes as
joint income would effect an unconstitutional usurpation of the states'
power to regulate property," seems too tenuous on its face to warrant
the necessity of rebuttal.
41See particularly the discussion of the Clifford case, p. 111, infra.
412INT. REV. CODE, § 51 (b) (1939).
'1311 U. S. 189 (1940).
", A short term capital loss can be deducted only from a short term
capital gain. Ir. REV. CODE § 117 (d) (1939).
4r INT. REV. CODE § 51 (b) and corresponding Regulation.
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was to consider the spouses united into a single tax unit when they
chose the joint return. Taft v. Helvering4" also recognized solidarity
in a joint return to permit charitable contributions of the wife greater
7
to be deducted from the joint inthan 15 per cent of her income
4 8
Since these two cases turned upon statutory construction, and
come.

involved merely optional use of the joint return to the taxpayer's advantage, they are not direct authority for the constitutionality of a
they do indicate judicial recognition
mandatory joint return. However
49
of the family unit theory.
5
Helvering v. Clifford " contains strong judicial pronouncements on

family unity. A husband declared himself trustee of property for his
wife with reverter to himself at the end of five years. Ownership of
the income from the property was given absolutely. Justice Douglas,
speaking for the Court, held that the income was still taxable to the

husband on both legal and practical grounds. Retention of control
was put forward as the controlling legal principle, but family unity
seems to underlie the decision.
"And where the grantor is the trustee and the beneficiaries
are members of his family group, special scrutiny of the arrangement is necessary lest what is in reality but one economic
unit be multiplied into two or more . . .,,i
48311 U. S. 195 (1940).
17A taxpayer can deduct charitable contributions in filing his return
REV. CODE § 23 (o)
to the extent of 15 per cent of his gross income. INT.
,
(1939).
,'Perceive that in a few instances the joint reti&h may be advantageous.
Comment (1940) 35 ILL. L. Rzv. 320 suggests four possibilities under the
present law. Unless separate property income is substantial in a community property state, however, it is never desirable to file a joint return because of the equal division of the income between husband and
wife by operation of law.
19 The family unit theory could be expanded to require not only the
spouses but also all persons living in the same family group to make a
joint return. The Wisconsin statute invalidated by the Hoeper case in-

cluded minor children, as does the German law.

MAGILL, TAXABLE INcorE

(1936) 288. What about a widowed sister living with her brother and
sister-in-law? Or the bachelor who still lives with his parents? Could
the income tax law look so minutely at economic status that it would
require two good friends, for example, school teachers sharing an apartment, to file a joint return? Such speculation leads beyond. the scope of
this paper, but may become more than mere speculation before too long.
11309 U. S. 331 (1940).
gild., at 335. The same idea is manifested in Helvering v. Horst, 311
U. S. 112 (1940) and in Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U. S. 122 (1940). In his
dissent to the Hoeper case, note 32, supra, at 220, Justice Holmes declared:
"Taxation may consider not only command over but actual enjoyment of
the property taxed," citing Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376 (1930), where
he had previously asserted: "But taxation is not so much- concerned with
the refinements of title as it is with ... the actual benefit for which the
tax is paid." Corliss v. Bowers involved the taxation of the grantor for
the income from a revocable trust. From a practical standpoint, is not
the benefit gained from marriage to an income-producing wife just as
great as the legal right to revoke a trust in her favor? Holmes' "flow of
benefit" test was picked up by the court in Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670
(1933) where Justice Cardozo declared that Congress can constitutionally
tax income used for the payment of life insurance premiums although
that income arises from an irrevocable trust created by the insured. Some
of the dissenters in Burnet v. Wells, relying repeatedly upon the Hoeper
case, are also found dissenting in Helvering v. Horst, supra, and Helvering
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Other language adds succor to the proposition that classification of
the spouses as a taxable unit would b reasonable.
"Since the income remains in the family and since the husband retains control over the investment, he has rather complete assurance that the trust will not effect any substantial
change in his economic position ...

For where the head of the

household has income in excess of normal needs, it may well
make but little diffe'rence to him (except income-tax-wise)
where portions of that income are routed-so long as it stays
in the family group."52

Even the dissent does not quarrel with family unity. Justice Roberts
merely complains that "legislation is not the function of the, judiciary
but of Congress." And later he adds:
"If judges were members of the legislature, they might well
vote to amend the act so as to tax such income in order to
frustrate avoidance of tax but, as judges, they exercise a
very different function." 53
This language is a far cry from the statement in the Hoeper case
that prevention of tax evasion does not serve as a basis supporting
the reasonableness of a classification. 54 The compulsory joint return
v. Eubank, supra. Arguably then, the dissent in the Hoeper case has had
three strong affirmations and the majority holding has been considerably
weakened.
U2Id., at 336. Italics supplied.
53 Id., at 338, 341.
" Hoeper v. Wisconsin, 284 U. S. 206, 218 (1931). Accord: Heiner v.
Donnan, 285 U. S. 312 (1932); Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230 (1926).
But cf. Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U. S. 85 (1935)
where the court condoned legislative attempts to avoid tax evasion, and
held that Congress can constitutionally require a trustor to pay the income
tax on transfers subject to revocation, even if the consent of a beneficiary
is needed for the recovation. Complacent beneficiaries afforded an easy
means of tax avoidance under the prior law, and to avoid this danger,
Congress can tax the grantor even if the "revocation beneficiary" is
bona fide. This is the penumbra doctrine of Purity Extract & Tonic Co.
v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192, 201, 204 (1912). By analogy, the "genuine,"
salary-derived, separate income of the wife would be the "innocent"
caught by the compulsory joint return, but the elimination of inter-spouse
transfers of property for tax reduction would justify the application of
the penumbra doctrine. Note also that future litigation on "Whose Income Is It?" would be greatly reduced by the compulsory joint return.
See note 8, supra.
In Helvering v. City Bank FarmersTrust Co., supra, Justice Roberts dis-

tinguished both Heiner v. Donnan, supra, and the Hoeper case. "There are,
however, limits to the power of Congress to create a fictitious status
under the guise of supposed necessity ...

[A conclusive presumption that

gifts two years before death are in anticipation of death] .. . is so grossly
unreasonable as to violate the due process of the fifth amendment. Heiner

v. Donnan . . . In the same category falls a statute seeking to tax the

separate income of a wife as income of her husband. Hoeper v. Wisconsin
.. supplied).
" (Italics
No mention is made of the "measure" idea, and an allocation of tax
liability on the join return should meet this dictum as well as provide
a basis to distinguish the Hoeper case. See discussion, p. 109, infra. Traditional due process and equal protection tests are suggested by Justice
Roberts: Is it a reasonable means to a proper end? Under this approach,
the compulsory joint return should satisfy constitutional dogma.
For an interesting commentary on Helvering v. City Bank Farmers
Trust Co., supra, see Lowndes, A Day in the Supreme Court With the
Federal Estate Tax (1936) 22 VA. L. REv. 261. The author states that the
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not only would diminish tax avoidance by making irrelevant the division of income between husband and wife, but it also is a reasonable
classification on its own merits.5
While in the trust and assignment cases the Court seems to be endeavoring to protect and improve our tax laws, it must be xemembered
that the benefits and control test always has been founded on some
legal right; thus, the Clifford decision talked about the control of the
husband through his trusteeship, and about his beneficial right of
reverter. Some authorities feel that it is conjectural whether these
tests could be extended to include a practical benefits and control
test which has no basis on a legal right.56 But in evaluating the compulsory joint return, and in determining its legal justification, does
consideration whether one, spouse has legal control over the other's
income properly enter the discussion? Is there not a more appropriate
legal basis to be found in terms of classification? Does not the additional
fact that the compulsory joint return will eliminate, quarrels, by reasonable means, between taxpayers and the Bureau of Internal Revenue
as to whether certain income belongs to the, husband or to the wife
add greatly to the justifications for such legislation?" Since classification by families seems more just than present tax liabilities, and since
the Court has indicated that it recognizes the family as a unit, constitutional objection to the mandatory joint return has faltered.

I

CONCLUSION

In a community property state where many citizens enjoy tax savings
by use of separate returns, law review advocacy of the, compulsory
joint return may be heresy. One who evaluates without prejudice the
present law must conclude that its distribution of the tax load has no
economic justification; yet we cannot expect Washington taxpayers
to beat the drums for reform.
Others, however, are beating those drums. Washingtonians should
listen, for when the crusade is won, our battle-scarred senators should
be ready to see that a desirable type of correction is made. Prejudices
and pocketbooks motivate our resistance to any disturbance' of the
advantageous status quo, but when defeat is imminent, we should be
ready to insure not only that the peace treaty strikes down the community property advantage, but also that it dooms separate returns
regardless of why the income is classed as individual. The compulsory
joint return will accomplish this reform simply and completely and,
since it appears that the, Supreme Court would uphold it if enacted
by Congress, we should all favor it as the best means to an inevitable
end.
ROBERT A. PURDUE.
City Bank case does not overrule Heiner v. Donnan-itmerely reinterprets
it, using
the rationale of the dissenters!
55
See discussion, p. 102 supra, as to inequality.
56
Comment (1941) 28 VA. L. Rzv. 88, 92. A negative opinion has been
expressed.
See Paul and Havens, note 10, supra.
57
Canadians thought of another means to reduce income tax avoidance
through inter-spouse transactions. Their law ignores transfers of property
from one spouse to another for income tax purposes and taxes the income
from such property to the one who first acquired it. Canadian Income Tax
Act, 1926, 16 and 17 GEo. V, c. 10, § 7., A possible precedent for such a
statute in the United States is Reinecke-v. Smith, 289 U. S. 172 (1933).
See Comment (1940) 49 YALE L. 3. 1279, 1288.

